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ADDRESS
FIGHTING TERRORISM AND PRESERVING CIVIL
LIBERTIES
James B. Comey *
Thank you. It is really great to be here, especially this time of
year, when the weather makes this place look all the more spe-
cial. What I want to do-the most important thing I am going to
do tonight-is take your questions. But I want to blather at you
first, and talk about my topic, "Fighting terrorism and preserving
civil liberties;" and I want to talk about what I think is the state
of play in discussing the interaction between our efforts to fight
terrorism and to preserve civil liberties, and some of the things I
think you should think about as we analyze that balance. Then, I
want to hear from you folks about what bothers you, what bothers
you about what I say, and what questions you have.
Let me start by saying that I think it has become a part of the
drinking water in this country that there has been a tradeoff of
liberty for security, particularly in the DOJ's response to fighting
terrorism; that in order to do what we need to do to get the job
done, it has become a part of the drinking water that we have had
to encroach upon civil liberty and trade some of that liberty we
cherish for some of that security that we cherish even more. It is
so much a part of the drinking water that there are two groups in
this country, in my experience. There are those who think that it
is okay, and those who do not think it is okay. I would like to ask
you to open your mind to the possibility that there is a third
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group-maybe some of you are here-people who understand that
there has not been a tradeoff between liberty and security in our
response to terrorism in this country and in our efforts to offer se-
curity to the people of the United States. Now, it is so much a
part of the drinking water that you are thinking that I am out of
my mind. But let me take a shot at it. Let me take a shot at ask-
ing you to consider my modest proposal, and it is no easy task,
because it requires a mastery of detail, and it requires all of us to
demand details on these topics.
Let me start by talking about the Patriot Act. Much of what
passes for debate in this country about fighting terrorism and
civil liberties focuses on the Patriot Act. Much of what passes for
debate about the Patriot Act is not a debate at all; it is certainly
not an informed debate. I am not saying that to take a shot at
anybody on any side of the issue, but to suggest that we need an
informed discussion about that tool and about a whole lot of other
tools used in this country in the fight against terrorism. What we
have is a lot of people who care about public life and public policy
standing around at cocktail parties with a crisp chardonnay in
their hand, and they talk about the Nationals baseball team, and
someone says, "Isn't the Patriot Act awful?," and everyone nods
and they move on to something else. We have town councils all
across this country passing resolutions condemning the Patriot
Act, calling for its repeal in many instances. I do not mean to be a
wise-guy, but I do not believe those town councils or those wine-
swillers or anybody else who is involved in similar exchanges un-
derstand what is in the Patriot Act. Why do I say that? First of
all, because you could not understand it and call for its repeal. It
is not possible. Even the ACLU does not call for its repeal. Be-
cause so much of what is in the Act is so smart, so ordinary, so
constitutional, so lawful that nobody would oppose it, and that is
not hyperbole.
Portions of it, for example, condemn racial discrimination; por-
tions of it condemn hate crimes against Sikh-Americans, backlash
crimes against Arab-Americans; portions offered more money for
first responders to terrorism, offered money to the families of
those killed responding to terrorism. People do not want to gut
those provisions. What has really happened with respect to that
particular piece of legislation, the Patriot Act, is two things. First,
discussion of it has been bumper-stickered-in fairness, by both
sides-by people who say they support it and by people who say
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that they do not support it. The second thing that has happened
is that the Patriot Act has become a vessel into which a whole lot
of people have poured their concerns about a whole lot of things.
What drives you nuts about politicians? I know what drives me
nuts about politicians. They tend to speak in generalities, even
when there is no campaign going on. What is it that you hear-"I
am the 'this' candidate. I am the 'that' candidate. I am for this, he
is for that,"-all the slogans and bumper stickers you hear. And
if you are anything like me, you look at the television and you
say, "Would you knock it off; tell me what you mean, tell me what
the details are. Tell me when you say this, what does that mean
about this proposal or that proposal." What drives you nuts is the
lack of detail, and it should drive you nuts about the debate be-
tween the tradeoff, or the non-tradeoff, between civil liberties and
security in this country. Let me take a shot at it, at the risk of
stretching your patience.
The confusion about the Patriot Act can be divided into two
categories: stuff that is not new, and stuff that is not in it. We do
not have time to cover all of that, but I want to talk about some
issues that have good people very concerned and a lot of people
worried and upset. Let me talk about one issue that is the hot-
button issue that has gotten a lot of attention. Libraries. There is
no mention of libraries in the Patriot Act. Not in the singular or
the plural. It does not appear in the hundreds and hundreds of
lines in that piece of legislation. Sometimes when I say that, peo-
ple say, "That is not right." It is right. There is no mention. The
so-called "library provision" of the Patriot Act is Section 215. That
gives authority to federal judges who sit on the Foreign Intelli-
gence Surveillance Court, the so-called FISA court, to issue or-
ders for tangible things, items that are listed as "books, records,
documents," and so on. If anyone has served process in a civil or
criminal case, those are terms of art. It allows a FISA judge to is-
sue an order for particular records, if an FBI agent first makes a
written showing that the records are sought for a foreign intelli-
gence investigation or an international terrorism investigation.
The statue expressly says that the investigation may not be
predicated solely on First Amendment activities.
Before the Patriot Act, and still, a federal prosecutor could ob-
tain books, records, documents, and tangible items by the issu-
ance of a grand jury subpoena. That does not involve a court, does
not involve a showing of any kind, and does not involve anyone
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signing out and swearing out an affidavit to obtain records. How
does this get mixed up with libraries? For the life of me, I do not
know. I have challenged a lot of journalists and said, "Look, you
want to do something really neat? Find out how this got mixed up
with libraries." We have never used it since the Patriot Act was
created in connection with a library, or medical records, or fire-
arm records-which has become a hot button issue as of late.
How did this get hooked up with libraries? I suppose it does not
matter, because it did. I think that it is the word "books," as in
"books, records, documents, tangible things," which in a prosecu-
tor's mind is completely missed. But to other people, that is where
the focus has been.
Let us compare Section 215 and its authority in counter-
terrorism investigations and international terrorism investiga-
tions to obtain records with grand jury practice. As I said, both
before and after the Patriot Act, prosecutors could issue subpoe-
nas for books, records, and tangible items to a credit card com-
pany, for example, or a bank, or a travel agency, or hotel. Prose-
cutors could also issue subpoenas to libraries. It has happened
from time to time. One example that is known to some people is
Ted Kaczynski, the Unabomber, who had sent this wacko mani-
festo to the Washington Post and New York Times that claimed
credit for the maiming and killing that had been done in the
name of the Unabomber. His brother informed the FBI that he
thought his brother, Ted Kaczynski, was the Unabomber. In an
effort to confirm that identification, the FBI looked at the mani-
festo and saw some obscure texts that were cited in there, and
they went to libraries with grand jury subpoenas that were asso-
ciated with Ted Kaczynski where he lived and checked the check-
out records to see if he had checked these texts out, and it turns
out he did. Four of the books checked out by him cited these ob-
scure texts and they were confirmed through the use of ordinary
grand jury subpoenas.
The first thing that I worry about when I hear people talk
about how outrageous it is that the government has the power
under Section 215 to obtain library records is that folks who
make this criticism of the Patriot Act want to create some sort of
sanctuary around libraries, but people do not. There are too many
pedophiles, too many criminals using libraries. Last spring, an al-
Qaeda operative named Mohammed Babbar came into the United
States and went to New York. He was of such concern to us that
[Vol. 40:403
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he was being covered-blanket coverage-by the FBI. The Attor-
ney General and I were being briefed on what he was doing every
single morning. One of the things he was doing was going from
his apartment, where he had a computer, to a New York Public
Library, and getting onto a computer. The best that the agents
who were looking over his shoulder walking behind him could
tell, he was emailing. Long story short, we ended up confronting
this guy and arresting him. He pled guilty and he is still in fed-
eral prison and cooperating with the government. He explained to
us what he had been doing. He said, "I went to the library be-
cause I knew that, on a regular basis, they scrubbed the hard
drive. They erased what went on that computer and I figured it
would make it harder for you to know what I was doing, and that
I was emailing other al-Qaeda associates around the world." We
do not really want to create some sort of sanctuary in libraries.
There is a provision in this so-called "library section" that up-
sets people a great deal. It is the so-called "gag order." When a
federal judge issues an order directing the production of books,
records, and tangible items, it comes with a prohibition on telling
anyone you received it. I am going to talk about improvements to
that section in just a second. Let us focus on the so-called "gag or-
der." I have two responses to the concern about the gag order.
First, it reveals a lack of understanding about the way regular
investigations proceed every day around the country-here in
Richmond and all around the country. I will bet there are people
who are in this room who have issued hundreds of regular sub-
poenas in the course of legitimate criminal investigations to fi-
nancial institutions. Every single one of those subpoenas, for
years, has carried with it a statutory gag order that prohibits the
financial institution from telling the account holder that the re-
cords had been subpoenaed. Why did Congress do that? They did
it for two reasons. One, we do not want the bad guys to know that
we are coming for them; and two, we do not want good people
smeared. A lot of times people report things or people to us that
they say are criminal; we investigate it, and it turns out there
was nothing criminal at all. Gag orders are a regular feature of
regular criminal process. It only makes sense that when Congress
was giving the authority for FBI agents to obtain records, bank
records for, example, in the most important of all investigations,
that they would carry with that order a gag order.
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I have discussed this with a number of libraries all across the
country. I have put it to them in a way that I hope they do not
think I am being a wise-guy. I say, "Look, anybody who cares
about privacy-and I know that people in this room and librari-
ans do-would never want an FBI agent investigating an indi-
vidual to tell the credit card company, the bank, the hotel, or the
library: 'Look, this is what we are doing. We have been told-it is
a rumor, but we have been told-that he is hooked up with al-
Qaeda. We are checking it out. That is what we are doing."' No-
body wants that. Anybody who cares about privacy does not want
a word said about what is being investigated. So by definition, the
recipient of that Section 215 request, or a grand jury subpoena,
does not know the facts. Why then would it be their business to
make the decision to tell this guy that the FBI had come for his
records?
Now, there is fair criticism of this provision. As drafted, it does
not say that the recipient can speak to a lawyer and challenge it
in court. That is a fair criticism. The Attorney General testified
and the Department of Justice agrees that this omission is a flaw,
and that it should be changed. People should be able to receive
that process, and it ought to come with a gag order; but if they
think it is unlawful or inappropriate, they ought to be able to
challenge it in court and talk to a lawyer, just as you can with a
non-disclosure order on a grand jury subpoena. Librarians, in my
experience, do a tremendous amount of good in this world. I am
not just saying that because the wife of the President is one.
There are some changes in order for that provision, and I have
mentioned two of them. People should be able to talk to a lawyer
and challenge it in court. I think there should be a third. The pro-
vision says that you are seeking the records "for" an international
terrorism investigation. We think it should say the "records
sought are relevant to" an international terrorism investigation.
That is the way we have always understood it. Those are changes
you are going to see in that provision of the Patriot Act. That is
the issue with libraries.
Much of the confusion about that provision, as I hope I have
started to show you, reflects some misunderstanding about the
way we do criminal investigations in this country. I saw a press
release criticizing a phrase in the Patriot Act that threw me. It
said the Patriot Act "allows the secret accessing of a person's re-
cords." That is what we do in criminal investigations in this coun-
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try. Bank records, phone records, credit card records are accessed
in secret for the reasons I told you-so the guilty do not get away,
and so the innocent do not get ruined. We have obtained records
in that way thousands and thousands of times to prosecute mob
bosses, credit card cheats, drug dealers, corporate crooks-all the
people that are routinely investigated and prosecuted. The fact of
the matter is that, before the Patriot Act gave this authority to
counter-terrorism and counter-intelligence investigators, the
rules for obtaining documents were tighter for them than for fed-
eral prosecutors investigating credit card fraud, or mafia crime,
or corporate fraud.
I saw another press release that struck me because it was way
off the mark. It said the Patriot Act "allows the government to in-
vestigate citizens without probable cause and without their con-
sent." That, when you first hear it, has a certain ring to it; it kind
of strikes you in the gut. But if you take the time to drill down in
that, your response is, "Gee, if the government needed probable
cause to investigate, or someone's permission to start an investi-
gation, that is the end of our criminal justice system," especially
for complex crimes. When someone tells us that this guy is a ter-
rorist, or there has been a fraud committed, we investigate to see
if that is true. We investigate to see if there is probable cause to
arrest, to search, or to take any Fourth Amendment action. That
is where we go into the federal and state criminal justice system.
If we had to start there in ordinary state or federal investigations,
or, heaven forbid, in terrorism investigations, we would be in a
bad place.
I have spent the last few weeks meeting with lawmakers to
help engage in this debate-it has been a robust debate about the
Patriot Act, as it should be. People have suggested, and even a
senator has suggested, "Shouldn't we raise the standard for this
ability to obtain documents or grand jury subpoenas to probable
cause?" My response is: Mohammed Atta's roommate. Mohammed
Atta piloted one of the planes that crashed into the World Trade
Center. Let's imagine that he had a roommate and we had this
Section 215 provision on September 12, 2001. If I am running
that investigation, like many of you who have run criminal inves-
tigations, what do I do when I encounter Mohammed Atta's room-
mate? I want to see his bank records; I want to see his phone re-
cords, his credit card receipts, his rental card slips, his travel
documents. If I found out he went to Las Vegas, I want his hotel
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records; I want to see every tape from that casino; I want to see
who he met, where he went, and what he is doing. If I need to
make probable cause to get those documents, I am out. I do not
have probable cause to believe that his roommate is up to no
good. I have got a bad feeling. I have got reasonable grounds for
concern. But I do not have probable cause. When we hear that in
this debate, I think that reflects a lack of understanding for the
way that government investigators do their work and the way
that we want them to do their work.
Another hot button issue is sneak and peek search warrants.
We in law enforcement do not call them that because it conveys
this image that we are looking through your sock drawer while
you are taking a nap. We have had in law enforcement, long be-
fore anybody in this room was born, something called delayed no-
tice search warrants. They were created by judges around the
country, including in this circuit, and interpreted by those judges
as "reasonable" under the Fourth Amendment to allow, in certain
circumstances, the government to obtain, based on a written
showing of probable cause, a search warrant, and to delay no-
tice-not abandon notice-that a search had been conducted. A
lot of circuits expressly upheld that; the Supreme Court, in a case
that addressed electronic searches and seizures, said that any
challenge to a delay in notice was "frivolous." Each standard was
different all around the country: how long the delay could be; dif-
ferent standards for how you could get them; how you had to
show the emergency; etc. Enshrined now in the Patriot Act is a
single nationwide standard for how, in terrorism cases and regu-
lar criminal cases, a judge can go about deciding whether to grant
delayed notification in a search warrant. Like I said, this delayed
notification was around long before I was born, and not used very
often around the country. Since this issue has come up, we have
looked at the numbers and we have found that we do it about fifty
times a year in this country-about once for each state. We do it
when it really, really matters. I have done it as a federal prosecu-
tor.
Now that I am here, I will give you an example that comes from
right here in Richmond. When I was a federal prosecutor in
Richmond, we had a situation where a drug gang was coming into
town from New York, where all bad things come from. This drug
gang-we did not know much about them-was slinging a lot of
crack into the area. The DEA had an informant, and he told us,
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"Look, the two guys who run this operation have an apartment,
and they just delivered five kilos of cocaine to that apartment."
This information was reliable, we had other information to cor-
roborate it, and we had probable cause to seize those drugs. The
question was, what do we do? Do we seize the drugs, heat up the
two guys, endanger the informant, and never find out exactly who
these guys are involved with, or do we let five kilos of coke walk
out on the streets of Richmond? Tough choice. We did not have to
make it, though. Why? Because we had in the Eastern District of
Virginia, in the Fourth Circuit, like everywhere else in this coun-
try, a judicially created doctrine of delayed notice search.
We went to a federal magistrate judge in Richmond, we laid out
what we knew, the DEA agent swore to it, and we obtained per-
mission to conduct a search of the apartment and to make it look
like a burglary. The DEA went there, found the drugs where the
informant said they were, took the five kilos, took the television,
took the stereo, and, because all agents in my experience are frus-
trated thespians, took three cans of beer out of the fridge, dumped
them down the sink and scattered them about. Oh yeah, and be-
cause we watch "Matlock," we broke the window from outside in.
Then we waited; and what did the two leaders of this organiza-
tion do? They called the cops! We had a marked unit who had
been briefed and he responded. He walked in, and when he saw
these two knuckleheads, he said, "You are, sir? Can I see your li-
cense? And this is your apartment? Yes it is. And you live here,
too? And what is your social security number? Okay, gentlemen,
what was taken?" "Well," they said, "The stereo, the television,
and the bastards drank our beer." "Anything else taken?" the offi-
cer asked. "No, no, nothing else." "Okay," the officer said, "I'll get
back to you." To make a long story short, I do not know if it was
thirty days later or forty-five days later, after we had figured out
the twenty-five to thirty people involved in this organization, we
locked them up. Then we unsealed the search warrant, offered to
return the TV and the stereo, which nobody wanted, and we paid
to fix the window, and made a very successful and important
criminal case.
That was a delayed notice search. It took me four minutes to
explain that to you, and the challenge we face is finding that
space in American life to tell that story, or another story like it.
We had another case a few months ago involving a huge ecstasy
ring. We had a member of this ring coming across the border from
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Canada days before we were about to arrest 170 members of the
ecstasy ring in Canada and the United States The informant
says, "Yeah, he's coming and he's got a huge load of ecstasy in a
false compartment of a gas tank." So what do we do? The Second
Circuit had created delayed notification search warrant long ago,
but we had a standard with the Patriot Act. We went to a federal
judge in northern New York, got a search warrant for the car and
permission to "steal" it. So this guy comes across the border, and
he stops to use a rest area. While he was in the bathroom, the
DEA took the car and then sprinkled broken glass in the parking
lot. Thirty thousand hits of ecstasy were in the car. Three days
later, when he was arrested along with 169 others, we unsealed
the search warrant and told him that this had been done. Why do
I tell you this? I hope it helps you understand why this tool mat-
ters to law enforcement and how ordinary it is and how lawful it
is, and how it takes a demand for the details and how it takes the
space in American life to demand those details.
There is another one I get a lot of questions about, and that is
the issue of roving wiretaps. That is something else that sounds
awful. Who would want to rove anywhere? What is this about? It
is "Big Brother;" there is this satellite "up there." Those of you
who watch the show "24" on Fox know there is always a satellite
up there, looking down on me, checking my vitals. People hear
about roving wiretaps and they get concerned. Here is the deal. In
1986, Congress gave us the authority to conduct roving wiretaps
in criminal cases, drug cases in particular, because what we saw
happening in the 1980s was that drug dealers were using cell
phones-they were the big ones at the time-and then they would
dump them. They would use the phone for a while, dump it, and
get a new one. Congress, in bi-partisan legislation, gave us the
ability to get a warrant on the person, and not the instrument, if
we could make a showing that the person was switching phones
to elude law enforcement. We have the ability, if we make that
showing, to follow the suspect-no matter what phone he is on.
That has saved law enforcement precious hours; sometimes it is
only hours, but they are precious hours. We do not have to go
back to the court, back to the phone company, and get paperwork
for that facility. Instead, we can go to the phone company once we
find out the new number and show it to them and say, "We can
intercept this guy's calls." What did the Patriot Act do? It took
that authority that we have been using for almost twenty years
and gave it to foreign counter-intelligence and counter-terrorism
[Vol. 40:403
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investigators. It gave them the ability to go to the FISA court,
again a court made up of federal district judges, and make a prob-
able cause showing-a showing that we have probable cause to
believe that the suspect is the agent of a foreign power-and that
he is trying to thwart surveillance by changing phones. That is
how we get a roving wiretap order. Again, that took three min-
utes to explain. Our challenge is avoiding losing these authorities
because we lack the time to explain how these things work.
Overall the Patriot Act is smart stuff that came from the crimi-
nal side that has been updated for a technical age, and I submit
to you that it has not caused a tradeoff of liberty for security.
But what's not in it? People's concern about immigration
largely has nothing to do with the Patriot Act. People's concern
about Guantanamo Bay has nothing to do with the Patriot Act.
People's concern about data mining, which I think should be fo-
cused more broadly than it is, is a legitimate issue and an impor-
tant issue, but it is not in the Patriot Act.
There is one thing I want to mention that people talk about but
is not in the Patriot Act. That is the issue of people detained in
the continental United States by virtue of Presidential authority
as "enemy combatants." Jose Padilla. He is detained in the brig in
South Carolina. He is not the only person detained. Another is Ali
al-Mari. He is a Saudi national who was detained in Illinois. He is
not a citizen, so there has not been a huge focus on him from a lot
of the people. Another was Yasser al-Hamdi. His case was here in
the Eastern District of Virginia, but he was captured on the bat-
tlefield in Afghanistan, so it is sort of easier to get your arms
around his case. But Padilla is a guy who came into the United
States, landed in Chicago and was arrested, then held as a mate-
rial witness and in my custody when I was United States Attor-
ney. There came a day-it was a Sunday as I recall-that I got a
phone call. It was someone telling me that the President was di-
recting me to turn him over to the United States military. It took
my breath away when I first heard it. I thought, "Wait a minute,
the President is ordering me to turn over someone who is in my
custody over to the military? He is an American citizen; what is
up with that?"
I have been asked that question many times. It is a profound
exercise of presidential power. It raises legitimate questions; but
before people, when they talk about Padilla, get too upset, I ask
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them to help me answer a question-it is a hard one: What would
you do? You are the President of the United States and you have
concluded that an American citizen had come into the United
States bent on an act that transcended the meaning of the word
crime-more like an act of war. You found yourself in a situation
where you could prove that easily beyond a reasonable doubt, but
you could not use the evidence in a court of law because of the
sources and methods that generated it, or (again, hypothetically)
maybe you concluded that the evidence you could use established
beyond the clear and convincing evidence standard, that this in-
dividual was bent on those acts that transcended crime. You
could use that evidence in court, but maybe not convict the person
beyond reasonable doubt. What would you do?
Often, since 9/11, the government has used immigration laws
to incapacitate people on a temporary basis. It is sensible, too; it
has generated some debate, it is complicated, but it is used on
people that are not American citizens. Often the government has
used the material witness process. It was used on Padilla when
he was first arrested. There is a very limited opportunity to de-
tain someone. It is measured in days, and if there is consent,
weeks. But what do you do when someone like that comes into the
country? The answer that some people say is, and it is not unrea-
sonable, "I would follow him." This is where I really am being a
wise-guy: I argue that that response is the product of too much
television. Nobody-nobody-can be followed twenty-four hours a
day, seven days a week. That is the way the world works, you
simply cannot follow another human being like that. Now we fol-
low people all the time-people who commit bank robberies, peo-
ple who sell drugs, and we follow them. We take the risk that we
will lose them, but that risk comes with the object of the crime be-
ing achieved; that is to say, the drugs will be delivered, the guy
goes to the crime scene, or he robs the bank. We run those risks.
The question for all of us, and the President of the United States,
too, is: When the crime-although you cannot call it a crime-
involves the kind of things that this situation involves, do you run
that risk? Do you run the risk of losing him on the "El" train or
the subway, and that he reappears somewhere and does some-
thing that changes the world? That is a hard decision. The Presi-
dent decided that he was going to use his authority to detain that
person in military custody. Reasonable people disagree. What is
important is that it is making its way through the courts. How-
ever that case comes out, whether the Fourth Circuit or the Su-
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preme Court agrees with the Government's argument that the
President has this power pursuant to the Congressional authori-
zation to use force against those involved in the 9/11 Attacks,
whether or not they agree, people in this room need to think
about this issue, because there will be more Jose Padillas. There
is a guy we call Jaffar al-Tayar-we also call him Adnan Shukri-
juma-who is a commercial pilot, fluent English speaker, and he
is out there somewhere. Al-Qaeda knows, as much as we know,
the value of an American citizen. We have devoted huge resources
to tracking aliens who come into and out of this country. Citizens
pose a whole different issue, and it limits our ability to track or
incapacitate that person, and that's the way it should be. We are
an enormously free and open country, especially for our citizens.
No one wants to change that. But when the next suspected terror-
ist comes, what do you do?
I had a fascinating discussion with the Minister of State for
Northern Ireland. She said:
Our countries are pointed in different directions. You have devised
the greatest criminal justice system in the world, the most sophisti-
cated, and the most complex. You have the ability to deal with all
sorts of criminal issues, RICO, continuing criminal enterprise, con-
spiracy that spans years. We in Northern Ireland need to copy that
system. Now that we have relative peace, we need to deal with the
arson rings, extortion rings, mobsters, the way you have perfected
over the past half-century. We, in Northern Ireland, have devoted
thirty years to developing a system for preventative detention. It is
something you haven't grappled with in your country.
So I do not have an answer for you, but anybody who cares about
security or the rule of law in this country needs to think about
these issues and participate. Whether the courts agree or dis-
agree with the Government on this issue, I believe the issue will
come up again. Perhaps it will be one that does not fit within the
rationale that the court decides on the President's authority to
use force. Then what do we do?
I want to say a word about something that was amazing in the
Patriot Act-it was amazing and breathtaking, and it changed
the world. FISA, or the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, was
established in 1978 in the wake of a lot of the abuses that the
Church-Pike Commission found. The key term in FISA is "agent
of a foreign power." The FISA statute allows a variety of elec-
tronic surveillance or physical searches aimed at spies or interna-
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tional terrorists. They are people or agents of a foreign power, ei-
ther classic spies or people who are participants with an interna-
tional terrorist organization. One of the most common misunder-
standings, even with some lawyers, is how we get wire taps, even
to search. There is a sense that we do not need probable cause,
that there is a lesser standard. That is not right.
To get a criminal wiretap, the Government needs to show, and
the court needs to find, that there is probable cause to believe
that he is a participant in a predicate offense (drug dealing, for
example), and that a particular phone is his phone, and that he is
using that phone in furtherance of that predicate offense. We can
get the wiretap.
If the Government believes that this man is instead an agent of
al-Qaeda and wants to use FISA to intercept phone calls, the
Government has to establish probable cause by a typed and
sworn affidavit that the suspect is an agent of a foreign power,
and that that is his phone. One difference is that we do not have
to show that his phone is being used for spy stuff, or terrorism
stuff. We simply have to show that he is an agent of a foreign
power and that is his phone. People think that is easier. In prac-
tice? Not with terrorist groups. It is often much easier to show
that a terrorist is involved in other criminal activity than it is to
show that they are the agent of a foreign power. You may have
seen some of this challenge with the Moussaoui case and some of
the discussion with the 9/11 Report.
What happened to us in the FISA world? It is called "the wall."
What is the wall? It is a combination of law and lore that led to
the separation of two groups of people: FBI agents who are con-
ducting criminal investigations of would-be spies and terrorists,
and FBI agents involved in intelligence investigations using FISA
authority on those same people. It is a complex story as to how it
happened, but on September 11, 2001, we found ourselves with a
wall that ran from here to the ceiling. My good friend Pat Fitz-
gerald, who is the United States Attorney in Chicago, best illus-
trates this. In the 1990s, he was the leader of a group of prosecu-
tors working with a team of FBI counter-terrorism agents in New
York, working on making a criminal case against a guy by the
name of Usama Bin Laden who was the leader of al-Qaeda. Most
people had not heard of either him or the group yet. They were
conducting surveillance; they were doing searches; and they were
talking to people. They spoke to a number of people: informants,
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witnesses, police officers, foreign police officers, foreign spies,
they even spoke to al-Qaeda operatives who came from the dark
side to talk to us. We had a number of cooperators who agreed to
talk to us. There was only one group they could not talk to under
this wall, and that was the FBI intelligence officers conducting an
intelligence investigation into al-Qaeda and Usama Bin Laden
who were right across the street. They were conducting searches,
FISA wiretaps, and physical surveillance; they were up on some
of the same instruments. The two best sets of minds we had look-
ing into al-Qaeda, and there was an antiseptic separation be-
tween them. The Patriot Act destroyed, in a single stroke, that
wall. Pat Fitzgerald has a way of describing it that I have taken
to repeating. He says, "You know what? The Patriot Act was not
rushed; it came ten years too late."
So this is the debate. I do not want to say there are "sides" be-
cause there really are not sides in the Patriot Act debate. The
sides sort of wrap themselves around and meet in the back. Many
folks who say they are on the right have the same concerns as
folks who say they are on the left. The answer is that theirs are
concerns that can be-and should be-answered by those of us in
the government.
Good people are always going to disagree about important pub-
lic policy issues, especially when it comes to government power.
That disagreement is healthy. Questioning government power is
the healthiest thing in our public life. Our country was founded
by people who had big problems with government power, which is
why they were not done with the Constitution when they wrote it.
That is why they wrote the Bill of Rights. All of us should ques-
tion power. I am in the government and I know that sounds like a
strange thing for me to say. My obligation is to answer those
questions. My obligation is to explain what I am doing, because if
I cannot explain it, I ought not to be doing it. Sunshine is the
world's greatest disinfectant. What we are trying to do, as we dis-
cuss our response to terrorism and especially with the Patriot
Act, is to talk until you are sick of us. Our goal is to get as much
stuff out there, to get as much declassified, to push details, to get
all of it out there that we can without jeopardizing investigations.
(We will share those intelligence details in a classified setting
with Congress.) We want an informed discussion of these tools
under the Patriot Act. We cannot do that unless we supply the
details, and you demand the details.
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Both sides, as we do this, need an attitude adjustment. People
who are concerned, who are critics, need to take a breath, grab
the glass of chardonnay a little tighter, and demand the details.
In the end, they may disagree and say, "I still do not like it." And
that is fine. That is what is great about this country. But do it
with understanding. On the other side, people who are defending
the Act should not be impugning people's motives, should not be
saying those people are Commies when they question government
power. They should question power, and it is a healthy thing to
do.
Let me return to my proposal. As we have that discussion, I
hope all Americans, or at least those of you in this room, will
leave your minds open to the possibility that I am not crazy; that
you will leave your minds open to the possibility that there has
not been a trade off of liberty for security, and that there need not
be. However you come out on the debate, I urge you to participate
and demand the details. Understand them and then take a posi-
tion. If we do that, we will be in a great place. When we look back
on this thirty years from now, whether people agree or disagree, I
hope they will say, "We looked at it; we thought about it; we
chewed on it; and we did the best we could." Thank you for being
part of the debate.
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